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Introduction
Chile has been called the “promised land” of Latin America, a First World country, and
an economic miracle. Privatizing social security in Chile has often been hailed by economists as
the key for their unprecedented economic growth and success within the past few decades—so
much so that other countries have adopted similar pension models within their own countries.
Somewhere along this path of astonishing economic growth, Chile, like other developed nations,
has arrived at a point where it can no longer assume that the typical worker is a man. Yet as the
gap continues to decrease between female and male labor force participation, the gap between
female and male retirees remains ever present. In other words, the typical retiree is still a man.
Because the calculation of retirement benefits is based on the idea of individual insurance, the
uncontrollable economic, cultural, and demographic characteristics that shape the present reality
of the Chilean woman are also shaping her future. Chile’s transition from a pay-as-you-go
system to a system of individual accounts was economically sound and macroeconomically
successful, yet I argue that it wasn’t pareto optimal, as the variable of gender was lost in the
calculation of transition costs.
Through constructing the economic profile of the average female Chilean worker—observing
female wages, fertility, life expectancy, education, and retirement age—this study aims to
replicate and demonstrate the gender pension differential that has existed under the privatized
model of retirement in Chile since 1981 by means of simulation. Additionally, the results of this
study of Chile’s past and present will bridge significant discussion into Chile’s future.
Hypothetically having the ear of the Chilean Constitutional Congress, my research will foster
suggestions for system design and policy changes, such as an increase in the female retirement
age or expanding the benefits of maternity leave and childcare that could significantly improve
the position of the average Chilean female retiree under a system of privatized retirement.
This study is structured as follows; Section I provides relevant historical background on Chile’s
systems of retirement, Section II is the literature review, Section III details the theoretical
framework, Section IV explicates the empirical framework and analysis, Section V describes the
data and summary statistics, and Section VI concludes with the results and discussion.
I.

Historical Background

The Pre-Reform Evolution of Retirement in Chile: 1924-1980
It’s impossible to measure the success of anything without simultaneously comprehending the
reason for its existence; success is virtually inseparable from the achievement of goals. Any
study attempting to measure the success of a policy, for example, ought to start by identifying
why that policy was originally created. This is precisely where this study begins.
The success of the Chilean retirement pension system—past or present—is assessed by the
extent that it achieves the end it was created for. To identify these ‘ends’, this chapter begins
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with the origin story of social policy and retirement within Chile in the 1920s. It is then preceded
with a section detailing the particular design and deficiencies of the distribution retirement
system as it existed shortly before the reform of 1981—laying out the ‘ends’ for which the 1981
reform was then created to achieve.
Age of Formation: 1924 – 1951
The development of a ‘welfare state’ has generally been a milestone reached first by larger, more
developed nations. Yet despite happening later in time, the adoption of social policy within Latin
American countries has actually been introduced at an earlier period in development than these
industrialized nations—in large part due to the seriousness of poverty and socioeconomic
inequalities that exist in underdeveloped countries (Arellano, 1985). The Chilean experience is of
particular interest because it was one of the pioneers in Latin America for the development of
social policies, leading the charge for greater equality of opportunities. This section will review
the rapid and strong development of social policy, and more specifically of social security and a
retirement pension system that took place in Chile between 1920 and 1972.
During the 19th century, and up until the Great Depression in 1930, the driving force behind
Chile’s economic development was external demand. Minerals 1 and agricultural exports were the
leading sectors of their economy. Saltpeter extraction was considered the main driving economic
force during the last two decades of the 19th century up until the First World War. The role of the
State, consequently, was therefore oriented toward the construction of basic infrastructure for
exportation. For the benefit of their domestic economy, the State found mechanisms to capture
part of the fruits of export. The resources of export taxation accelerated the construction of
railways and basic infrastructure (Arellano, 1985).
The forces of industrialization gave rise to a strong migration of labor from rural Chile, leading
to an extremely significant diversification of the economy and social structure (V., H.C. 1991).
Yet with this new age of industrialization came new social problems, derived from the living and
working conditions of workers 2. It was during this period that the ‘social question’ came into
play, brought to the forefront by many workers’ formations and street protests—many of which
turned violent 3.
With the election of Arturo Alessandri in 1920 came a wave of new legislation to address this
social question. These social laws were presented in 1921 and were passed in September of 1924
under military pressure—including the first and most significant step towards a system of social
security and retirement within Chile—the Cajas de Previsión 4.
“La Caja de Seguro Obrero” (predecessor of the SSS), “La Caja de Empleados Particulares”
(Private Employees) and “La Caja de Empleados Público” (Public employees) were enacted by
these laws. All of these held in common the establishment of some sort of compulsory insurance
mechanism to cover risks of disability, old age, and illness. They were subsequently expanded
Copper, silver, gold
No regulations for safety or hygiene in the workplace, resulting in many labor accidents, extremely low wages, and no
maximum workday. Child and female labor especially lent itself to numerous abuses.
3 Even though strikes were illegal, there were 200 strikes in the last decade of the 19th century alone. Within the earlier
years of the 20th century, strikes intensified and became so violent that thousands of workers’ lives were lost (SOURCE).
4 Directly translated into English: Provident Funds
1
2
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over the next few decades to improve protection and to cover other risks. The administration of
these institutions was in the hands of the State.
The system was continually reformed and expanded in the years beyond 1924, with its most
notable reformation happening in 1952. New workers were covered, and new benefits were
gradually established. Special attention was also paid to the female worker’s entry into the
workplace. Despite having a longer lifespan than men, women were given the right to an earlier
pension, and was exempted from the obligation of recording a minimum number of contributions
during working years in order to qualify for a pension. This was done in order to consider and
recognize women’s unpaid work in the home (Arellano, 1985).
At the same time during this period of reform, the administrative structure of the “Caja de
Seguro Obrero” was reorganized, giving rise to the Servicio de Seguro Social (SSS).
The increase in benefits that occurred during this period was reflected in higher tax expenditures
on social services, which more than tripled between 1930 and 1955. This expansion in social
spending is particularly visible in the increased coverage of the social security system that took
place. In 1935, just over 900,000 workers were affiliated with the ‘Cajas,’ while in 1955 there
were 1,600,000 affiliates, which represented roughly 65% of the working population at the time
(V., H.C. 1991).
However, the increase proportion of the population that was favored by social spending was not
actually uniform. Particular unions and workers’ groups sought out laws creating benefits in their
favor. The result was a complex legislation that resulted in highly unequal structures of benefits
and contributions across sectors and occupations. At the end of this expansion period, there were
more than 32 different ‘Cajas’ with very different benefits, contributions, standards, and
regulations (V., H.C. 1991).
Pre-Reform Design and Deficiencies
The reforms underwent by Chile’s social security system between the years of 1924 and 1980
were numerous and extensive 5. This section, however, pays particular attention to the design of
the social security system of retirement as it existed shortly prior to the 1981 reform, specifically
during the late 1970s. This period is examined in order to starkly observe the deficiencies in the
design of the distribution system—as it was these deficiencies that provided the presumed
justification for the 1981 privatization reform, and the basis for assessing its success.
Description of the 1970s Social Security System
The version of Chile’s retirement system that existed shortly prior to the 1981 reform is often
described as occupation-based, complex, and, quite frankly, out of control. Until the radical
privatization in 1981, the Chilean system was structured based on semi-public institutions,
mentioned previously, called ‘Cajas de Previsión,’ which collected the contributions that had to
be made by workers and their employers and were responsible for paying the benefits granted by
the system. Although there are some discrepancies as to the classification and nature of this
5

For discussion on the reforms occurring between this period, reference Arellano, J.P (1895), pp. 27-62
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system 6, the system as it existed for the 55 years prior to the reform is most often characterized
as a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system.
By the 1970s, roughly 75% of the country’s workforce was affiliated with this system, based on
more than 32 Cajas (Arellano, 1985). Most workers in Chile were affiliated with one of these
three main institutions:
1. El Servicio Seguro Social (SSS) – 45% of the workforce
2. La Caja de Empleados Particulares (EMPART) – 11% of the workforce
3. La Caja de Empleados Públicos y Periodistas (CANAEMPU) – 7% of the workforce
*The 30 or so remaining Cajas accounted for 12% of the workforce*
TABLE 1.0
ACTIVE DEPOSITORS BY ‘CAJA’ IN 1979
NAME
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TRANSLATION

%

Servicio de Seguro Social (SSS)

Social Security Service

64.88

Caja de Previsión de Empleados Particulares
(EMPART)
Caja Nacional de Empleados Públicos y
Periodistas:Sector Empleados Públicos
(CANAEMPU)
Caja Nacional de Empleados Públicos y
Periodistas: Sector Periodistas (Periodistas)
Caja Bancaria de Pensiones (Bancaria)

Provident Fund of Private
Employees
National Fund of Public Employees
and Journalists: Public Employees

17.59

National Fund of Public Employees
and Journalists: Journalists
Bank Fund of Pensions

0.67

Caja de Previsión y Estímulo de los
Empleados del Banco de Chile (Banco de
Chile)
Sección Previsión Social del Banco Central
(Banco Central)
Caja de Previsión y Estímulo de los
Empleados del Banco del Estado (Banco del
Estado)
Caja de Previsión de la Defensa Nacional
(Defensa)
Dirección de Previsión de Carabineros de
Chile (Carabineros)
Caja de Previsión de la Marina Mercante
Nacional: Sección Tripulantes de Naves y
Operarios Marítimos (TRIOMAR)

Provident and Stimulus Fund of
Employees of the Bank of Chile

0.12

Social Security Section of the
Central Bank
Provident and Stimulus Fund of
Employees of the Bank of the State

0.05

Provident Fund of National Defense

ND

Provident Fund of Law Enforcement
of Chile
Provident Fund of National
Merchant Marines: Ship Crew and
Maritime Operators

ND

See Lindert, P.H. (2021), pp. 292 - 296

11.62

0.58

0.32

1.24
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Caja de Previsión de la Marina Mercante
Nacional: Sección Empleados y Oficiales
(CAPREMER)
Caja de Previsión de Empleados del
Hipódromo Chile (Hipódromo Chile)
Caja de Retiro y Previsión Social de
Empleados del Club Hípico de Santiago (Club
Hípico de Santiago)
Caja de Retiro y Previsión Social del
Valparaíso Sporting Club (Sporting Club)
Caja de Retiro y Previsión Social de
Empleados del Club Hípico de Antofagasta
(Club Hípico Antofagasta)
Caja de Ahorro y Retiro de Empleados del
Club Hípico de Concepción (Club Hípico
Concepción)
Caja de Previsión Social de los Profesionales
Hípicos de los Hipódromos Centrales
(Hipódromos Centrales)
Caja de Ahorro y Retiro de Preparadores y
Jinetes de Antofagasta (Preparadores y Jinetes
Antofagasta)
Caja de Ahorro y Retiro de Preparadores y
Jinetes de Concepción (Preparadores y Jinetes
Concepción)
Caja de Previsión para Empleados de Salitre
(Salitre)
Caja de Previsión Gildemeister (Gildemeister)
Sección Especial de Previsión para los
Empleados de la Compañía Cervecerías
Unidas (CCU)
Sección de Previsión Social de los Empleados
de la Compañía de Consumidores de Gas de
Santiago (Compañía de Gas)
Sección de Retiro de los Empleados de
Mauricio Hochschild y Cía. Ltda. (Hochschild)
Caja de Previsión Social de los Ferrocarriles
del Estado (FF.CC.)
Caja de Retiro y Previsión de los Empleados
Municipales de la República (EE.MM.
República)
Caja de Previsión Social de los Empleados
Municipales de Santiago (EE.MM. Santiago)

Provident Fund of National
Merchant Marines: Employees and
Officers
Provident Fund of Employees of
Horse Racing Track of Chile
Retirement and Social Security Fund
of Employees of the Horse Racing
Club of Santiago
Retirement and Social Security Fund
of Employees of the Horse Racing
Club of Valparaíso
Retirement and Social Security Fund
of Employees of the Horse Racing
Club of Antofagasta
Retirement and Social Security Fund
of Employees of the Horse Racing
Club of Concepción
Social Security Fund of Professional
Jockeys from the Central Racetracks

1.03

Retirement and Social Security Fund
of Trainers and Jockeys of
Antofagasta
Retirement and Social Security Fund
of Trainers and Jockeys of
Concepción
Provident Fund for Saltpeter
Employees
Provident Fund for Gildemeister

NS

Special Section Fund for Employees
of the United Brewing Company

0.04

Section of Social Security for
Employees of the company of
Consumers of Gas in Santiago
Retirement Fund for Employees of
Mauricio Hochschild y Cía. Ltda.
Provident Fund for the State
Railways
Retirement and Provident Fund for
Municipal Employees of the
Republic
Social Security Fund for Municipal
Employees of Santiago

0.03

0.02
0.03
0.02
NS
NS
0.05

NS
0.15
0.04

NS
0.55
0.24
0.08
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Caja de Previsión Social de los Empleados
Municipales de Valparaíso (EE.MM.
Valparaíso)
Caja de Previsión de Empleados y Obreros de
la Empresa Metropolitana de Obras Sanitarias:
Depto. Empleados (EE. EMOS)
Caja de Previsión de Empleados y Obreros de
la Empresa Metropolitana de Obras Sanitarias:
Depto. Obreros (OO. EMOS)
Caja de Previsión Social de los Obreros
Municipales de la República (OO. MM.
República)
Source: Superintendencia de Seguridad Social
NS: “Not Significant”
ND: “No Data”

Social Security Fund for Municipal
Employees of Valparaíso

0.01

Provident Fund for Employees and
0.05
Manual Workers of the Metropolitan
Sanitary Works Company:
Employees
Provident Fund for Employees and
0.04
Manual Workers of the Metropolitan
Sanitary Works Company: Manual
Workers
Social Security Fund for Municipal
0.55
Manual Workers of the Republic

The broad protection of members, as well as the proportion of members covered by the system
put Chile at the head of Latin America in terms of social security. Yet even so, the design of the
distribution system was riddled with significant deficiencies.
Deficiencies Created by the System’s Design
Several evaluations were conducted to scrutinize the performance of and diagnose deficiencies in
the old pay-as-you-go system—the most notable and useful of these being the Klein-Saks
mission7 and a report by the Oficina de Planificación Nacional, or ODEPLAN, in 1971. Each
study provided a snapshot of the Chilean pension system as it stood up until the second half of
the 1900s, varying in detail, and varying in results. Yet the most common and significant source
of deficiencies found across studies was the occupation-based design of the social security
model, resulting in significant unfairness and wealth inequality between workers, and the
inefficient management of the ‘Cajas,’ resulting in the system being significantly underfunded.
1. Occupation-Based Design: Unfairness
The occupation-based design of the old system is apparent after reviewing Table 1.0 above, as it
details specific Cajas de Previsión that existed for a wide array of workers, from the employees
of the Bank of Chile to the jockeys and trainers of Antofagasta.
As mentioned previously, the increase of the population that was favored by social spending
during the age of expansion was not actually uniform. Benefits were higher for the groups that
exerted the most pressure. The result was a complex legislation that resulted in highly unequal
structures of benefits and contributions across sectors and occupations. By the 1970s, there were

7

Misión Klein-Saks (1958), El programa de Estabilización de la Economía Chilena y el Trabajo de la Misión Klein-Saks
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more than 32 different ‘Cajas’ with very different benefits, contributions, standards, and
regulations.
This section will review the varying standards that existed to obtain old-age pensions between
six different Cajas (SSS, EMPART, CANAEMPU, Bancaria, Banco de Chile, Banco del
Estado).
These observations are based on the situation of these Cajas in decades well in advance to the
changes made over the last 15 years of the old system. This is done in order to show what the old
system was truly like before fundamental changes were made to it during the period from 1974
to 1980, so that an appropriate comparison can be made with the new pension system. It should
also be noted, that the Cajas provided several forms of “pensions,” such as sickness, widowhood,
orphanhood. However, for the sake of relevancy to the overall study, this comparison is limited
to the comparison old age pensions.
I.

Servicio de Seguro Social (SSS) 8
Beneficiaries: All workers (obreros: manual workers) earning a salary, apprentices,
some groups of self-employed workers, etc.
Requirements for Old-Age Pension
- Men: 65 years of age
- Women: 55 years of age
- Minimum of 800 weeks of contributions (approximately 15 years)
- Density of contributions no less than 0.5 in the period of affiliation
Calculation of Pension
Base amount (50% of the monthly base salary), plus 1% of said salary for every 50
weeks in excess over the first 500 weeks, with a maximum limit of 70% of the
monthly base salary
*Definition of Base Monthly Salary*
The sum of the incomes on which taxes have been made during the five calendar
years prior to the date of retirement, divided by 60

II.

Caja de Previsión de Empleados Particulares (EMPART) 9
Beneficiaries: Private employees that make deposits to this Caja
Requirements for Old-Age Pension
- Men: 65 years of age
- Women: 65 years of age

8
9

Law No. 10.383 (1952)
Law No. 10.475 (1952)

10

Calculation of Pension
Base salary multiplied by the number of years of service/contributions, divided by 35.
The pension may not exceed the base salary.
*Definition of Base Monthly Salary*
Average of the taxable wages affecting the pension amount (wages received in the 60
months prior to the collection of the benefit).
III.

Caja Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Periodistas: Sección Empleados
Públicos (CANAEMPU) 10
Beneficiaries: contracted employees of the Public Administration, employees of
services or institutions independent of the State; employees of the Sociedad de
Fomento Fabril, Sociefad Nacional de Agricultura and Sociedad Nacional de Minería.
Requirements for Old-Age Pension:
- Minimum of 10 years of contributions
- 65 years of age
Calculation of Pension:
Base salary multiplied by the number of years of service, divided by 30. The pension
cannot exceed the base salary amount.
*Definition of Base Monthly Salary*
Average of the salaries, wages, fixed fees, commissions, and gratuities received by
the depositor in the last 30 months served, and on which contributions have been
made.

IV.

Caja Bancaria de Pensiones: 11
Beneficiaries: Employees of commercial, mortgage, and development banks
Requirements for Old-Age Pension:
- 55 years of age
- Minimum of 3 years of contributions

35

Calculation of Pension:
Base monthly salary multiplied by the number of years of contributions, divided by
*Definition of Base Monthly Salary*

10
11

DFL No. 1.340 (1930)
Law No. 8.569 (1946)

11
Average of the salaries, wages, fixed fees, commissions, and gratuities received by
the depositor in the last 30 months served, and on which contributions have been
made.
V.

Caja de Previsión del Banco de Chile
Beneficiaries: Employees of the Bank of Chile
Requirements for Old-Age Pension:
- 55 years of age
- Minimum of 13 years of work

35

Calculation of Pension:
Base monthly salary multiplied by the number of years of contributions, divided by
*Definition of Base Monthly Salary*
Average of the salaries, wages, fixed fees, commissions, and gratuities received by
the depositor in the last 36 months served

VI.

Caja de Previsión de Empleados del Banco del Estado de Chile 12
Beneficiaries: Employees of the bank of the State of Chile, the Superindendency of
Banks, the Caja of Labor Accidents, and the Caja itself.
Requirements for Old-Age Pension:
- 55 years of age
- Minimum of 15 years of contributions
Calculation of Pension:
Base monthly salary multiplied by the number of years of contributions, divided by
35
*Definition of Base Monthly Salary*
The average taxable wages of the depositor in the last 24 months, and on which taxes
have been made. In the case of depositors who have completed 35 years of service,
this will correspond to the average of the last 12 months.

Additionally, all the Cajas mentioned above, with the exception of the SSS, included within their
benefits the granting of “pensiones de antigüedad” (seniority pensions 13). For EMPART, to
receive a seniority pension, 35 years of work was required, for CANAEMPU it was 30 years,

Statues published in 1948
Defined: if a worker completes the required years of contributions/service, you can retire at any age without pension
reduction
12
13

12
and for the Caja Bancaria de Pensiones and the others in its sector, 24 years was required (V.,
H.C. 1991).
For example, in the Caja de Bancarias, where the requirement for a seniority pension was 24
years of work, an employee who began working at age 18 could then retire at the age of 42 with
no pension reduction. In contrast, a worker affiliated with the SSS—the Caja whose number of
members represented approximately 65% of the total members within the social security system
in 1979—who also began working at age 18, had to wait until the age of 65 to receive an old-age
pension.
It’s also notable that the Cajas de Previsión used different methods to estimate the monthly base
salary—a measurement directly tied to the calculation of the pension amount of a worker. In the
case of SSS and EMPART, the base salary was calculated considering the salaries received
during the last 5 years, while in CANEMPU and the Caja de Bancaria de Pensiones and others
within its sector, only the last 3 years were considered in calculations. The calculations were
based on an average of nominal wages, so those workers whose average was calculated
considering a smaller number of months were less harmed.
All these observations aside, the discrepancies between the Cajas de Previsión are put into the
clearest perspective when comparing their replacement rates, or in other words, the amount of
pension calculated as a percentage of the last taxable salary.
TABLE 1.1
CAJA DE PREVISIÓN

REPLACEMENT RATE (%)

SSS

60.8

Caja Bancaria de Pensiones (and others in its sector)

Began work at age 18:
Began work at age 25:

EMPART

86.8

CANAEMPU*

78*

81.3
69.6

Source: V., H.C. 1991
*The 78% replacement rate of CANAEMPU was a lower limit for some employees, as they were
entitled to the special benefit called “pensiones perseguidores,” or “matching” if they obtained a
managerial position or reached the top in the respective ranking. This meant that the pension they
received upon retirement was readjusted according to variations in the salaries of active workers
in the jobs that they had held previously (Acuna R., Rodrigo & Iglesias P., 2001).
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According to this analysis, it reveals that those in the most disadvantaged sector were affiliated
with the SSS, which, as mentioned previously, made up 65% of all affiliates in the system.
2. Inefficient Management of ‘Cajas’: Underfunded
The ratio of contributors to pensioners within the first few decades of the system’s operation
generated a significant surplus—enticing the government to increase benefits. However, these
benefits would not be sustainable as the system matured (OECD, 1998). The two options for
confronting this situation were to either reduce benefits, or to work up a fiscal surplus large
enough to finance the deficit of the pension system. In response, contribution rates were raised.
To put this increase in generosity into perspective, in 1955 there were 12.2 active contributors
for every one retiree, and by 1980 there were only 2.5 contributors for every one retiree (Acuna
R., Rodrigo & Iglesias P., 2001).
TABLE 1.2

Contribution Rate Among Main Cajas (%)
CAJA DE PREVISIÓN
1974
Servicio de Seguro Social (SSS)
56.60%
EMPART
64.50%
CANAEMPU
54.75%
Data Source: Superintendency of APFs

1980
33.20%
41.04%
32.50%

The rate of contribution for all Cajas de Previsión maxed out in 1974, with levels as high as
64.50% of the taxable wage. Rather than easing the financing problem, raising the contribution
rates to such levels as in TABLE 1.2 encouraged contribution evasion—serving to drive the
system into an even deeper state of financial imbalance (Acuna R., Rodrigo & Iglesias P., 2001).
Although the contribution rate was cut down by roughly 20% by 1980, it still represented
roughly an obscenely large portion of the taxable salary.

Active depositors/work force,
contribution rate (%)

Contribution Rates of Main Cajas and Contribution Evasion
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

1968

1969
SSS

1970

1971

1972

EMPART

Data Source: Superintendency of APFs

1973

1974

CANAEMPU

1975

1976

1977

1978

Active Depositors/Work Force

1979

1980
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The maximum coverage of the old system peaked in 1973, with 79% of workers were active
depositors into the system. With the sharp increase in contribution rates introduced in 1974,
coverage slowly decreased, and by 1980, only 64% of workers were active depositors into the
system—suggesting that the higher rates of contribution generated higher rates of contribution
evasion among workers. This is a singular explanation of this trend, as other sources have also
cited an increase in the unemployment rate during this time as an additional factor (OECD,
1998). In the last few years of the old pension system, because contributions were not sufficient
to cover the payout of pensions, fiscal grants had to increase to finance the system.
Salvador Allende attempted to bring equilibrium to the social security system by increasing
benefits and extending coverage to 90% of the working population. New coverage was extended
to merchants, small industrialists, and some self-employed workers in the informal sector of the
economy. However, since those already within the system maintained their benefits without
increased taxation, this generosity spent on a newly covered population translated into financial
chaos (Lindert, P.H., 2021).
The 1981 Reform: Privately Managed Individual Pension Accounts
With the design and deficiencies of Chile’s PAYG system laid bare, we can more clearly
perceive the main ends of the 1981 reform: decreasing wealth inequality between retirees and
creating a more efficient style of management to improve the overall funding of the system.
Before analyzing how successful the new system was at achieving these specific microeconomic
needs, this section begins with a description of the design of the privatized pension model, which
reveals how the system intended to fulfill those needs. The following section provides a brief and
selective overview of the macroeconomic effects of the reform.
Description of the 1981 Reform
Los Chicago Boys and the Introduction of Free Market Economics
Although the reformation of the PAYG system to a system of private accounts didn’t officially
occur until the 1980s, one could argue that the transition was put into motion much earlier than
that with the cultivation of market liberalism in Chilean economic ideology. In the 1950s, an
exchange program of professors and students was established between the University of Chicago
and the Universidad Catholica de Chile. This led to the training of approximately one hundred
students in both masters and PhD programs in the United States, under a curriculum of freemarket economics. The group of Chicago-trained Chilean economists made a name for
themselves as “Los Chicago Boys,” not only because of their collective education, but also due
to their continued collaboration with each other upon their return to Chile. Among them was Jose
Piñera, who would become the chief architect of Chile’s 1981 retirement pension model
(Brender, V., 2010).
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Chile, like most Latin American countries during that time, was predominantly gripped with a
structuralist and Marxist economic ideology. Consequently, Los Chicago Boys were not able to
play an integral role in Chilean policymaking until the military coup of 1973 that brought
Augusto Pinochet to power (Valdés, 1995).
At the age of 30, Jose Piñera was recruited by Augusto Pinochet to spearhead structural reform
in the social sectors. Under this position, Piñera’s brainchild of a revolutionized model of
retirement pensions was able to become reality by 1981 (Brender, V., 2010).
A Privatized Model of Individual Retirement Accounts
“The worker is a king in the sense that he owns his money; he is a capitalist.” (Jose Piñera)
Jose Piñera had a driving vision of aligning the needs of workers with economic success. His
model for retirement pension funds was considered so revolutionary because it was the first of its
kind in the history of the world where every worker was entirely responsible for his or her own
retirement. Instead of a burdening the active worker with funding the pensions of current retirees,
Jose Piñera harnessed the power of capital markets through what is known as the AFP system.
Under this scheme, workers are mandated to contribute a proportion of their monthly wages that
will fund their future retirement pension. Workers may receive their pension through any or all
the three pillars that make up the system:
First Pillar – Capitalization Accounts
10% of monthly salaries are withheld from a worker’s paycheck. For-profit firms, known
as the Administradores de Fondos Pensiones (AFP) then invest these funds in the
financial market and that money grows over the course of the worker’s life until
retirement with compound interest. Workers are free to choose among seven different
competing AFP corporations to invest their withholdings: Cuprum, Provida, Planvital,
Uno, Modelo, Habitat, and Capital (Cumsille Rojas, B. D. L. P. 2015).
Additional payments to the AFP include 7% for health, 0.8% for disability and
survivorship, and a 2.6% average fee to the AFP (Joubert and Todd, 2011).
Second Pillar – Voluntary Savings
Offers workers the possibility of saving above the mandatory 10%, receiving tax benefits,
in accounts known as APVs, or an Ahorro Previsional Voluntario 14. If workers are able to
invest more than 10% of their wages in this pillar, they are able to access those funds
before retirement age (Cumsille Rojas, B. D. L. P. 2015).
Third Pillar – Solidarity Pillar

Institutions that can manage these accounts include the AFPs, Administradores de Fondos Mutuos, Administradores
de Fondos de Inversión, Administradores de Fondos para la Vivienda, Administradores Generales de Fondos, Banks,
and Life Insurance Companies.
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State-run pillar that guarantees a minimum pension amount to the most vulnerable
members of society through either the Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS/Pensión Básica
Solidaria) or the Solidarity Pension Supplement (APS/Aporte Previsional Solidario). 15
The Basic Solidarity Pension acts as a non-contributory pension for those most
vulnerable upon retirement—those without other pensions. This benefit is means tested;
it’s payable to the poorest 60% of Chile’s population at the age of 65 for both men and
women. Recipients must also have been a resident at least four or five years prior to the
claim, with a total of 20 years of residency in Chile (OECD, 2019).
The Solidarity Pension Supplement is a supplementary welfare pension which targets
APF affiliates with low pensions. The amount given as a supplementary pension depends
on the existing pension amount of each individual worker (Joubert, C. J. E. & Todd, P.E.,
2020). Pensioners can claim this benefit if they have a defined contribution benefit lower
than a specified amount known as the maximum welfare pension (PMAS). The remaining
qualifying conditions for this benefit are the same as the Basic Solidarity Pension
(OECD, 2019).
Macroeconomic Impact of the 1981 Reform: A Brief and Selective Overview
Roughly the first half of the twentieth century in Chile was characterized by a relentlessly
increasing role of the state in an attempt to accelerate economic growth. Yet instead, the country
found itself crippled with hyperinflation and plagued with of the lowest growth rates in Latin
America (Edwards 2002).
The military coup of 1973 marked the largest threshold between structuralist and neoliberal
economic thought in Chile—one that many economists claim provided the launching pad for the
rapid economic growth that followed. In stark contrast to what came before, this period
following the coup was characterized by a minimalist perspective on the provision of social
services and a reduction in state intervention by targeting only the poorest groups for social
expenditures (De Mesa & Montecinos, 1999).
As a result of the bold market-oriented reforms initiated under this new regime, Chile’s average
rate of growth bordered on 7 percent between 1986 and 1995 (Edwards, 2002). With such a
dramatic growth rate, Chile became a star performer not only among Latin American countries,
but among all countries of the world. It was what became known as “the Chilean Miracle”.

With the 2008 reform to the system, PBS and APS replaced the originally conceived PASIS (Assistance
Pensions/Pensiones Asistenciales) and the PMG (Minimum Guaranteed Pension/Pensión Mínima Garantizada) in order
to more aggressively address old-age poverty (Cumsille Rojas, B. D. L. P. 2015)
15
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SOURCE: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Perhaps the most revered aspect of Chile’s neoliberal reform was the implementation of Jose
Piñera’s revolutionary privatized model of social security. Until the 1900s, Chile was the only
Latin American country that had privatized its public pension system, but within fifteen years
following this reform, seven other Latin American countries had fully or partially privatized their
public pension schemes (Williamson, J. B., 2001). Among experts, there has been a mixed
consensus on the exact contribution of this pension reform in Chile’s economic boom.
Regardless, there has been a resounding notion among many economists that the experience of
Chile has been a clear macroeconomic success story (Arenas de Mesa & Bertranou, 1997;
Roldos, J., 2007; Piñera, J., 1999; Kay, 1997; Edwards, 1998; Queisser, 1999; Corbo and
Schmitt-Hebbel, 2003, to name a few).
While controlling the effects of other aspects of this period of reform 16, the creation of a
privatized system of individual accounts has been credited with a central role in helping develop
Chile’s capital market, stimulating labor force participation and productivity, and boosting
Chile’s traditionally anemic savings rate (Edwards, 1998; Corbo and Schmitt-Hebbel, 2003).

Structural reforms of the 1980s in addition to the reform of social security included trade liberalization, privatization,
fiscal reform, and financial reform (Edwards, 2008).
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Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) found that the pension reform increased Chile’s average
annual GDP growth rate by approximately 0.5%, manifesting itself within Chile’s saving and
investment, labor market, and capital market.
Total Estimated Effects of Pension Reform on GDP Growth (%)
Real average growth of the GDP in 1980-2001
Estimated effects of the reform on GDP growth

4.63

Saving and investment

0.13

Labor markets
Increase in employment
Increase in productivity

0.07
0.03

Capital market development and TFP
Total

0.2
0.49

SOURCE: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, Macroeconomic Effects of Pension Reform in Chile
Concerning saving and investment individually, Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) found that
average domestic saving increased from 0.7% to 4.6% of GDP per year during the twenty-one
years following the reform, while the investment rate increased by 1.2% of GDP during the same
period.
With regard to the labor markets, this study noted that with the reform came a sharp decrease in
the implicit labor tax, consequently leading to an estimated increase of 1.3% and 3.7% in total
employment in the Chilean economy. Informal employment contracted, while formal
employment was estimated to have increased somewhere between 7.6% and 32%. This
compositional change in the labor force was also reflected in an increase of average labor
productivity.
The pension reform also contributed significantly to deepening the financial maturity of Chile’s
economy, one of the most important determinants of GDP growth and of total factor
productivity. Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) estimated that somewhere between 31% and
46% of the increase in the rate of financial assets to GDP was accrued to the growth of the
pension funds between 1981 and 2001.
The economic transformation of Chile in the 1980s was nothing short of a marvel. The country
was growing at an unprecedented rate, unemployment hovered around 5%, and poverty was
seemingly in retreat (Edwards, 1998). The sources of this economic boom are constantly in
dispute among economists, yet more often than not, the pension reform is held up as one of the
central aspects of the Chilean Miracle.
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II.

Literature Review

Over the past four decades, the country of Chile has pushed past all others in Latin
America at an astonishing rate, becoming the wealthiest and most economically developed
country therein (Francisco, P. G., & Loreto, R. R., 2019). As previously explored, many
economists have attributed Chile’s rise to the top to the neoliberal economic policies of the
1980s, most often hailing the private pension scheme as the shining star. Under this model, the
calculated retirement pension of any given worker is directly determined by their labor force
participation over their entire working life, the wages that they earn, and their life expectancy.
Thus, in order to accurately simulate the gender pension differential of Chile, one must first
pinpoint and understand the unique profile of the female Chilean worker with regard to her labor
force participation, wages, and life expectancy 17. The aim of this literature review is to do
exactly that.
After first providing an overview of literature that details how female workers have fared
under the privatized system of retirement, this review will then cover studies that examine select
determinants of female labor supply in Chile: fertility and childcare, marriage and divorce, and
cultural attitudes surrounding labor force participation and educational attainment 18. Next, there
will be a reviewal of studies observing the gender wage differentials in Chile, either due to
differing labor supply elasticities between men and women, or labor market discrimination. Each
of pension determinant represents a separate subsection of this review.
How Female Workers have Fared Under the Privatized Model of Retirement of 1981
Previous studies analyzing the success of Chile’s privatized retirement pension system
have either ignored or insufficiently glossed over the gender dimension of the transition from a
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) regime to defined contribution accounts. It is only until more recently
that studies have focused specifically on the gender dimension. It is thus critical to begin this
review by analyzing the economic situation of female retirees in Chile before and after the 1981
reform and to generally observe the magnitude of the reform on women’s welfare in Chile.
The fact that the new system is mandatory to all workers has created certain
consequences, especially for women. Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos (1999) found that
although women’s lower salaries and their obstacles to formal employment greatly reduced their
social benefits in the PAYG system, the treatment of women in the area of retirement was
actually favorable. Within the old system of retirement, the pensions received by men and
women—with the same salaries and the required years of contributions—were equal, even
despite differences in life expectancy and retirement age. Additionally, women faced fewer
requirements than men in obtaining pensions; they could receive pensions 5 years earlier than
men, were required to work 5 years less than men, and under some Cajas, women retire one year
earlier per child.
However, life expectancy will not be observed in this literature review, as it only is relevant to the actuarial formula for
calculating individual pension amounts.
18 Educational attainment alone will not need to be examined in this review, as the effect of attaining certain years of
education can easily be simulated (i.e., 1 year of post-secondary education = 1 year less of pension earnings). The same
cannot be said about how cultural attitudes surrounding educational attainment impacts female labor force participation.
17
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When the privatized system was devised, it was expected to produce replacement rates of
around 75%, meaning that workers were expected to receive 75% of their average earnings in
working life in the form of an old age pension—yet only 1/3 of the members of the system
achieve this (Berstein et al., 2006). Using the OECD methodology to calculate replacement rates,
Berstein et al., (2006) found that the average male affiliate would receive 58% of his last salary
as a retirement income, while an average female affiliate would only receive 39% of her last
salary. Berstein et al., (2006) attributed this greatly to the actuarial formula for pension
calculation in the 1981 reform.
This formula included gender differentiation by integrating the actuarial factor of life
expectancy within its design, while at the same time keeping the retirement age of women at 60
years of age, 5 years below that of men. Because women tend to live 5 years longer than men on
average, this meant a relatively longer retirement period for women, and, in conjunction with
their lower legal retirement age, meant fewer available years of contributions to accumulate
those funds. Additionally, while the old system’s calculation of benefits reflected earnings of the
last working years, the new privatized system, based earnings over an entire career, with at least
20 years of required contributions. Berstein et al., (2006) concluded that women are especially
vulnerable under this design, as they are more likely to experience periods of unemployment due
to their culturally shaped role as homemakers. This disadvantaged position of Chilean women is
also compounded by the fact that, on average, women’s salaries were found to be lower than
men’s for equivalent roles (Berstein et al., 2006).
Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos (1999) found that if no differences in salaries existed
between men and women in Chile, the inequalities in pension funds between male and female
would be partially eliminated, but substantial inequalities would remain if men made
contributions 5 years longer than women do 19. Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos (1999) then
went on to analyze the effect of raising the legal retirement age for women to 65, the same as
men. If women and men retired at the same age (assuming labor-market inequalities do not
exist), inequities would decrease significantly, yet some would remain due to the actuarial
formula’s inclusion of life expectancy used to calculate pensions.
Berstein and Tokman (2005) conducted a similar study, focusing on why the relative
income position of women compared to men gets worse off in old age and how different
individual and labor-market characteristics of the system affect it. This analysis is centered
around a specific cohort of those born between 1960 and 1965—those that started working
around 1981 and who will retire in 2020 and 2025. This is the first generation that will enter the
privatized system without having been involved in the old system. Similar to the findings of
Arenas and Montecinos (1999), they found that the years women spent away from the workforce
during childrearing had a large if not the largest effect on retirement income—especially because
the period of childbearing replaces their earliest years of contributions—the years that could
have accumulated the largest portion of their retirement funds over their working life.
Berstein and Tokman (2005) also analyzed the intricate features of the retirement pension
system in relation to a counterfactual change—raising the female retirement age to 65 years,
similarly to Arenas de Montecinos (1999). They found that financing five fewer years of
retirement lead to increases of 9, 10, and 14% in the annuity of women in basic, middle, and
higher education. They then measured the impact on retirement income with the extra five years
added to the working life of a woman. First assuming that no contributions were made within
19

Assuming women and men retire at the legal retirement age (60 for women and 65 for men).

22
these five additional years, the balance of the APF account increases simply because it is
profitable for five more years. Under their assumption of a 5% rate of return, they found that the
balance in the APF account increased by 28% with the extra 5 years of contributions—seen more
visibly in the higher educated, because with those of low-income, the minimum pension partly
hides the effect. If the income and the contribution of women are estimated in these additional
five years using the same methodology with the probability of working and contributing updated
recursively, they found that the final effect would be even greater, between 31% and 43%.
Without this change in retirement age in women, Berstein and Tokman (2005) found that women
would either have to increase their number of working years or make extra contributions in their
pre-retirement periods. Overall, they found this to mean that women would have to retire at 66 or
67 to receive pensions roughly equal to men earning the same salary.
Labor Supply Determinants of the Chilean Woman
Fertility and Childcare
Among the studies examined, parenthood seems to be the leading cause of a reduced
labor supply in women. Childbearing directly impacts labor supply, through both years spent
outside of the labor force and in shortened working hours—reducing a female’s accumulation of
human capital (Cools, S., Markussen, S., & Strom, M. 2017). Using a simplistic model of labor
supply, known as the labor-leisure model, Cools, S., Markussen, S. & Strom, M. (2017)
demonstrated that a woman aims to maximize her level of utility under the restrictions of income
level and time. In this model, it is assumed that utility is dependent on her individual
consumption of goods and leisure. In order to consume, she must sacrifice hours of leisure time
and join the workforce to accumulate earnings. Yet in making these decisions, individuals are
always confronted with several restrictions.
In the case of a working-age woman, these restrictions span far beyond her level of nonlabor income, but also from the number of children in her household and the many social
restraints that come with that (Contreras, D., & Plaza, G. 2010). Contreras and Plaza (2010)
argue that with all else equal, a Chilean woman who has two children will have more restrictions
on her ability to participate in the labor force than a woman who has only one child—even more
so if the children are not yet of a school-going age.
Cools, Markussen and Strøm (2017) studied how family size affect parents’ labor market
decisions over their whole career until retirement by analyzing data from Norwegian men and
women—not the subjects of this study’s concern, but still regarded as generally and theoretically
appropriate. This study found that having additional children after the first two children causes a
sizable reduction in labor force participation of women. They observed that this effect eventually
fades as the children mature and will eventually produce an opposite, positive effect on the labor
force participation of women in the long run with no college degree. In other words, in the short
and medium run, additional children have an impact on labor force participation, while in the
long run, labor supply is restored. The study conducted by Cools, Markussen and Strøm is
unique from Contreras and Plaza (2010) in that it observes labor supply 20 years after childbirth.
Using an OLS regression, they concluded that hours worked weekly by women are, on average,
reduced by 5 hours per week during the first ten years of parenthood, and then by 1.8 hours a
week during the next ten years—showing that women who have relatively more children may
give less priority to providing labor in the workforce.
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While both of these sources presume that economic growth is impacted by the number of
children women have in their household, the study conducted by Parro and Reyes (2019) differs
in that it conjectures that it is economic growth that incentivizes women to have fewer children.
In particular, they cite technological advances as a strong source of economic growth for Chile in
the last few decades, leading to an increase in the productivity of workers and a consequential
rise in the going wage. With this increase in wages, the opportunity cost of staying home for
women has increased greatly, as motherhood becomes more expensive. Yet technological change
requires a workforce of more qualified workers, which then incentivizes mothers to have fewer
children, allowing them to achieve higher levels of human capital outside the home and
eventually participate more actively in the labor market.
All studies reviewed on this determinant of labor force participation, though conducted
differently, seem to reach the general consensus that the number of children a woman has is
negatively correlated with labor force participation.
A determinant of female labor-supply that is more policy-relevant is the issue of
childcare availability. As the explored literature has shown, the number of children per
household in Chile directly impacts a woman’s labor force participation rate, yet one could
question that if childcare were to be made more readily available to Chilean mothers, perhaps the
number of children per household would become a weaker or even insignificant determinant of
female labor force participation. There is a potential for policy action in this area, by facilitating
access to childcare for working mothers or mothers who would like to work.
Contreras, Mello, and Puentes (2011) concluded from a survey conducted in 2003 that
16% of women between the ages of 25 and 39 said that they abstained from looking for a job
because they had no options for childcare. They also found this to be the case for female youth,
whose labor supply is discouraged by the presence of young children in their household—
implying that they too play a role in at-home childcare and could be the explanation as to the
high percentage of young Chilean women who neither work nor go to school (Contreras, D., de
Mello, L., & Puentes, E. 2011). If this is the case, then there would be reason to speculate that
policy action for increased access to childcare would go far beyond labor supply of prime age
women but prepare younger women to obtain the human capital to supply labor in the long run.
Blagrave and Santoro (2017) took this study a bit further, by adding that better-located
childcare facilities open for longer hours have a positive impact on female labor supply,
especially in the case of Chile, where the infrastructure for transportation, especially among poor
communities, could be a restricting factor. 50% of women would benefit from adequate
childcare, and it is estimated that the labor participation would increase from anywhere between
1 and 8 percent (Blagrave, P., & Santoro, M. 2017).
As long as policies become more gender-friendly, like how adequate provisions of
childcare give women more free time to supply labor, it appears that the female participation rate
will continue to steadily increase. In addition to childcare, research has shown that the 1997
policy that lengthened the school day from part-time to full-time positively impacted female
labor supply (Blagrave, P., & Santoro, M. (2017).
Yet the study conducted by Contreras and Sepúlveda (2017) is skeptical of this,
introducing the idea that not all mothers responded the same way to this reform, as it will depend
on their individual preferences of leisure and consumption. They estimated that 5% of single
mothers without younger children entered the work force because of the policy—a relatively
small effect, but possibly explainable by the fact that the school day was still not fully
compatible with a full workday. They also estimated a negative and significant impact in hours
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worked per week on average, possibly explained by the fact that the increased length of the
school day decreases women’s spending on childcare, which increases disposable income, and
thus decreases hours they originally dedicated to the labor market. A secondary explanation
could also be that they are opting for part-time jobs, as they are more compatible with the new
school day (Contreras, D., & Sepúlveda, P. 2017). They also argued that the policy could have
been more effective if it had targeted earlier levels of education, like 1st and 2nd grade, as they
estimated that this would have had the strongest impact on female labor force participation. In
most developed countries, the length of the school day is highly compatible with the workday of
a woman, while in developing countries this is not the case—an integral detail of the economic
profile of the Chilean woman (Contreras, D., & Sepulveda, P. 2017).
Marriage and Divorce
In addition, a lot of what the family was and could be was dependent on the influence of
the Catholic Church. Up until 2004, couples were not allowed to divorce (Gallegos, J. V., &
Ondrich, J. I. 2017). It was only until that year that the regulation of marriages changed from the
Catholic Church to the State, providing a clear-cut observation starting point for a female’s labor
supply decisions post-divorce.
A study regarded as theoretically appropriate, conducted by Gert and Dimitri (2019),
used data from Flemish women to estimate the probability of female employment increasing
around the time of the divorce. In summation, they found that women were twice as likely to
increase their employment for a short period of time after the separation—a positive effect on
labor supply, as family income decreased, there was found to be a strong incentive to begin work
or increase working hours. Whether or not this effect is generalizable across-countries is another
question of further research.
Given the literature found specifically for Chilean women post-divorce, much of a
woman’s post-divorce labor supply decisions rely on previous determinants discussed
previously—number of children and childcare. A study conducted by Gallegos and Ondrich
(2017) looked specifically into the country of Chile, investigating the impact of the 2004 divorce
law on a woman’s decision to have a first child. Before the divorce law, no monetary
compensation was required if couples separated, and many men could avoid making spousal
support payments (Gallegos, J. V., & Ondrich, J. I. 2017). Most relevantly to this study, Gallegos
and Ondrich (2017) found that if the cost of raising a child falls mainly on the woman, her career
prospects are reduced post-divorce. Yet with the enforced mechanism that the law implemented
of spousal support, the impact on labor supply appears to be less steep, and positive in some
cases. Another relevant conclusion made by Gallegos and Ondrich (2017) was that the overall
fertility rate in Chile has decreased from 2.09 to 1.9 births per women between 2003 and 2010, a
trend possibly explained by the Divorce Law. More research should be found in this area to
connect more dots on what this means for a female’s labor supply, but from the previously
identified determinants, it might be reasonable to say that the divorce law aided in raising female
labor force participation in Chile, simply based on the fact that aggregate fertility decreased.
Cultural Attitudes Surrounding Female Work and Higher Education
All of these relatively classic determinants aside, Contreras and Plaza (2010) argue that
the cultural factors specific to Latin America and Chile cannot be discounted and are equally as
important, if not the most important determinants of female labor supply. Mainstream economics
has seemed to come up short in quantifying the importance of gender and its impact on the
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acquisition of knowledge. This is especially applicable for labor economics in Latin America and
Chile specifically (Contreras, D., & Plaza, G. 2010). Textbook economic models and studies can
only say so much about a Chilean woman’s labor choices—they do not take into account the
cultural determinant in Chile and how it could dissuade women from seeking higher education or
from entering the labor force.
More specifically, the study by Contreras and Plaza (2010) looks at the ‘machismo,’ or,
male-dominated culture in Chile and its impact on female labor supply and human capital
attainment. They conclude that women who have adopted more conservative cultural values
(meaning that they are more submissive to ‘machismo’) participate less in the labor market. This
article references several other works that analyze female participation in Chile, yet it criticizes
them because they fail to take into account the women that are influenced to join or not join the
workforce by cultural factors unique to Chile, such as cultural models of the family, social roles,
and established family attitudes towards these things. This study hypothesizes that in the short
run, cultural factors determine female labor force participation. They measure cultural factors
that might influence participation by first measuring the extent to which females have
internalized ‘machismo’, and second, measuring whether a woman can be considered
conservative or moderately conservative. Lastly, the study demonstrates that the presence of a
partner reduces the probability of female participation. All in all, the study concluded that these
cultural factors play a larger role than the effect of human capital accumulation. It would also be
reasonable to assume that these cultural factors could also affect a woman’s pursual of higher
education, and in turn, limit the potential wages she could receive across her lifetime. All in all,
the role of cultural attitudes surrounding an educated or working woman in Chile is not one
easily discounted.
Gender Wage Differentials
The diminished economic power of women represented through relatively lower wages
has a direct and detrimental impact on her retirement pension. The majority of previous studies
on the gender wage gap in Chile have assumed perfectly competitive labor markets with
perfectly elastic labor supply. This popular approach assumes that if two workers have the same
job and identical characteristics will be paid identical wages. Any residual difference is then
considered to be as a result of discrimination. However, these studies have been gradually
challenged, due to the existence of frictions in the labor market (Robinson, 1933; Madden, 1973;
and Black, 1995). This is especially important in an analysis in a developing economy such as
Chile. Only recently have studies started to consider the effect of imperfect competition in the
labor market on the gender wage gap. Newer literature suggests a “monopsonistic” framework to
explain how discriminatory wages between genders arise and persist if firms hold greater
monopsony power over female workers relative to male workers. For this to hold, the labor
supply of women to firms must be less wage-elastic then that of men.
The most recent study of the gender wage gap in Chile comes from Sánchez, Finot, and
Villena (2021). They use a dynamic monopsony model to estimate the labor supply elasticities at
the firm level to explain the Chilean gender wage gap. They found that Chilean men earn
approximately 19-28% more than women because of the difference in labor supply elasticities,
ceteris paribus. In particular, the largest wage discrepancy was found to be in the elasticity of
recruitment from nonemployment or informal employment. This could be interpreted to mean
that search frictions for women keep them in a state of nonemployment or informal employment.
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Potential explanations for this could be that for Chilean women, informality is more attractive
due to the lack of sufficient childcare coverage, or, that cultural attitudes regarding a working
woman dissuade them from engaging in formal work.
Additionally, Sánchez, Finot, and Villena (2021) found that in the long run, between-firm
differences in labor elasticities is higher than within-firm elasticities, suggesting that the gender
wage gap is also driven by structural factors generating gender sorting into firms. Lastly, they
found that the labor supply elasticities for high-income countries are higher than those obtained
in a middle-income country such as Chile for both men and women. This would suggest that
middle-income countries demonstrate higher labor market frictions, thus justifying their
monopsonistic approach.
From this sheer breadth of studies, the several intertwining and complex determinants of
the female labor supply in Chile are laid bare. Obviously, this literature review presents a limited
sample of studies and research, thus limiting potential determinants and perspectives on female
labor supply in Chile—yet it is sufficient enough to demonstrate the vastness of studies on the
labor supply determinants of wages, childcare and fertility, marriage and divorce, and cultural
attitude. This current study fits into and contributes to the existing body of literature, as it ties
Chilean female labor supply and her wages directly to the study of the gender pension
differential. More specifically, instead of analyzing one single determinant of a female’s labor
supply and its effect on her retirement pension, this study will allow for a simulation of all these
variables simultaneously, through meta-analysis of these previously explored studies.

III.

Theoretical Framework

Take an individual with the lifespan of [0,1]. This interval is split between working and retiring.
Each point on this interval the individual is given one unit of time. When this individual chooses
to work, this one unit of time earns the wage w in the labor market. The individual can then use
this labor income to either consume or save at the interest rate r, assumed to be greater than the
individual’s subjective rate of time preference. Two types of goods are a general consumption
good, denoted by c, and a leisure good, denoted by 𝜌𝜌. General goods produce an instantaneous
utility of ln(c). If this individual is retired, then they are using their unit of time for leisure.
Leisure goods produce a fixed utility level of 𝜌𝜌. It is also important to note that leisure goods are
time intensive, requiring one unit of time to enjoy them. Thus, the leisure good can be
“purchased” at the price of 𝜌𝜌.
The Retirement Decision: Lifetime Utility of an Individual
(1.1)

1

1

� ln𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)exp(−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜌𝜌 � exp(−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
0

𝑅𝑅

The parameter 𝛽𝛽 represents the subjective rate of time preference, or, in other words, how much
this individual prefers to consume when young to consuming when old. 𝛽𝛽 must lie between 0 and
1. The individual discounts future utilities using 𝛽𝛽, which is assumed to be less than the market
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interest rate (𝛽𝛽 < r). When r > 𝛽𝛽, the rate of return on savings, r, the postponement of
consumption is favored, and general consumption grows over time.

The parameter c(t) is time, t, general consumption. The parameter 𝜌𝜌 is the fixed utility from
consumption of a leisure good. R represents the date of retirement. Also note that exp(-𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽) < 1
for all t > 0, and is decreasing in time, t. The individual will only consume leisure goods during
retirement, on the interval [R,1].
The budget constraint of this individual reads:
(1.2)
1

1

𝑅𝑅

� 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)exp(−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + � 𝑝𝑝exp( − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = � 𝑤𝑤exp( − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
0

𝑅𝑅

0

Here, the individual works on the interval [0,R] and consumes leisure goods during retirement,
on the interval [R,1]. The left-hand side of the budget constraint represents the present value of
the consumption of goods, whereas the right side of the budget constraint represents the present
value of labor income. The present value is calculated using the market interest rate, r, because
this is the rate that the individual can borrow or lend.
Using this developed model of retirement, the provision of tax-financed old-age social security
can (individual’s labor income at a rate, 𝜏𝜏, and uses the taxed income to provide an old-age
pension in the sum, s.
Thus, the individual’s budget constraint now appears as
(1.3)
1

1

𝑅𝑅

1

� 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)exp(−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + � 𝑝𝑝exp(−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = � (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑤𝑤exp( − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + � 𝑠𝑠 exp(−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
0

𝑅𝑅

0

𝑅𝑅

This individual will now take home (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑤𝑤 in after-tax labor income for each period in the
interval of [0,R] that they work. In the interval of retirement, [R,1], they will receive an old-age
pension of s.
However, under a privatized model of social security, the government instead mandates that a
working individual saves the fraction of their income, 𝜏𝜏, into a private savings account that earns
the rate of return r over the interval [0,R]. Now, the date that an individual chooses to retire will
have a direct impact on the size of the benefits that they receive upon retirement. The
individual’s budget constraint is still (1.3), however, with the realization that s is governed by
their own actions through
(1.4)
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𝑅𝑅

1

� 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏exp( − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = � 𝑠𝑠 exp( − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
0

𝑅𝑅

Within this equation, the present value of the fraction of their income, 𝜏𝜏, exactly equals the
present value of the old-age pension that this individual will receive upon retirement.
IV.

Empirical Framework

1.1 Estimating post-retirement well-being gender differential
To estimate the post-retirement well-being of Chilean women relative to men, I construct an
equation that estimates the accrued pension under the rules and regulations of a privatized model
of retirement as it exists specifically in Chile. This means assuming a 10% annual mandatory
pension contribution across all workers, and a legal retirement age of 65 for men, and 60 for
women, respectively. The equation begins with forming what is hereby known as the Lost
Pension Principle, measuring the mandatory annual proportion of a worker’s wage to be
contributed to an AFP retirement fund, given by:
Lost Pension Principle = (0.10)(w(L))
where w(L) represents wages earned in a year. The equation is then completed by regarding the
compounding effect of multiple years of fund contributions across a worker’s lifespan at a
specified market rate of return,
(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒓𝒓)𝒏𝒏 (0.10)(w(L))

where r represents the market rate of return, and n represents years of contributions, which is
assumed to be equivalent to a Chilean’s working life. In order to clearly estimate the postretirement well-being gender differential, several assumptions are made. First, the assumed
market rate of return to be used is calculated as the average rate of return across all seven AFP
funds from 1981 to 2019. The rate of return given is thus representative of the average market
performance of the entire AFP system across these given years, not just one AFP individually.
Furthermore, this model assumes a fixed level of risk aversity among AFP affiliates, only
choosing to observe the rates of return recorded from the moderate-risk pension fund, known as
Fondo C. The working life, n, of a worker in this estimation is assumed to be the difference
between their respective legal retirement age and their age upon entry in the workforce, posteducation. The level of education is fixed across male and female workers, assuming secondary
graduation within 4 years at the age of 18. The working life of women is thus given by n = 42
whereas for men, it is given by n = 47. Additionally, the working life of both the male and
female worker is assumed to be uninterrupted, and wages between male and female workers are
assumed fixed and equal.
In summation, the aim of this section of my empirical analysis is to estimate the retirement
pension differential if a female and male worker choose to retire as early as legally permitted,
ceteris paribus, or, assuming all other factors between them are equal. In plainer words, how
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much of a difference in post-retirement well-being is created between the female and male
retiree, simply based on the fact that men retire 5 years later than women do?
1.2 Counterfactuals: Wages and Contribution Densities
Using this model for simulation, I then go on to pose several counterfactuals, in order to examine
how a change in wages, fertility and education contribute to the retirement pension gender
differential in Chile.
Differential Wages
This simulation rests on the assumption that Chilean men earn, on average, 19% - 28% more
than women as a result of the differences in labor supply elasticities, ceteris paribus (Sánchez,
2021). Using these findings, this simulation adjusts w(L) for men to be 19% higher than w(L) for
women at every income level. In order to purely observe the impact of a wage differential, it is
now assumed that men and women choose to retire at the age of 65. Education level between
men and women remains constant, with graduation from a secondary institution at the age of 18,
with no workforce interruptions beyond this point. This simulation will serve to show the
retirement pension differential that is produced through the gender wage differential, ceteris
paribus.
Differential Wages and Retirement Ages
This simulation reincorporates differing retirement ages into the differential wage counterfactual.
While holding the w(L) of men to be 19% higher than w(L) of women, working life in years is
adjusted to be n = 47 for men and n = 42 for women. This simulation will serve to show the
retirement pension differential produced through differential wages and retirement ages, ceteris
paribus.
Incorporating Life Expectancy
I will then incorporate the factor of life expectancy by calculating the replacement rate of women
compared to that of men under the same rules and assumptions of the last two counterfactuals.
Replacement rate is defined as the percentage of an individual’s annual employment income that
is replaced by retirement income. To begin calculating the replacement rate, the retirement
annuity is found, using the formula
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑟𝑟

= Retirement Annuity = Ra

where Ri represents the total income earned in retirement, assumed to be an individual’s
retirement pension, and where r represents the length of an individual’s retirement in years. This
is found by subtracting an individual’s life expectancy with their retirement age. It is assumed
that the average female life expectancy at birth is 82 and the average male life expectancy is 77.
The replacement rate is then calculated by taking the ratio of yearly income earned in retirement
to yearly income earned during employment,
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = � � ∗ 100
𝑖𝑖

where Ra represents the retirement annuity, or, yearly income earned in retirement, and i
represents yearly income earned during employment. Holding constant the assumptions of the
last two counterfactuals, I will calculate the retirement pensions to estimate replacement rates of
the male and female Chilean retiree.
Additional Counterfactuals: Education, Childcare and Fertility
From here, I conduct a couple further simulations, presenting hypothetical scenarios measuring
changes in education and fertility to observe any impact on the retirement pension gender
differential.
The first education simulation performed rests on the finding that Chilean women are more likely
than males to reach higher schooling levels (Bravo, D., Sanhueza, C., & Urzúa, S. (2008). A
scenario is then constructed comparing the retirement pensions of a female individual that began
work after completing tertiary education and a male individual that began work after completing
secondary education. In this scenario, assuming men and women retire at their respective
retirement ages, working life in years, n, for women is assumed to be 38 years, whereas for men
it is assumed to be 47 years. Although it is a strong assumption, wages are assumed to be equal
between men and women, regardless of the female individual’s higher attainment of human
capital. This simulation serves to show the retirement pension gender differential that arises due
to the age at which one chooses to enter the labor force.
A second education simulation performed rests on the finding that Chilean women who complete
tertiary education receive 65% of the salary earned by Chilean men with the same level of
education (OECD, 2018). Using these findings, this simulation adjusts w(L) for women to be
65% lower than w(L) for men at every income level. This simulation assumes both men and
women graduate from university at the age of 22. It is also assumed that men and women retire
at their respective retirement ages.
The fertility and childcare counterfactuals simulate the impact of the birth of a single child and
an additional child on the retirement pension gender differential. Both simulations rest on the
assumption that the average age of Chilean women at childbirth is 29 years of age and that
access to free pre-school begins when the child is 4 years old (OECD, 2019). It is also assumed
that the woman is a single mother, who graduated from university at the age of 22. Respective
retirement ages of men and women remain in effect as well. The working life of a woman is then
calculated by subtracting her age upon entry into the workforce after education and the years
spent providing at-home childcare from her retirement age. In the first simulation, her working
life is thus n = 34. In the second simulation, it is assumed that she has an additional child while
her first child is 2 years of age. Thus, this requires her to take two additional years of at-home
childcare, reducing her working life to n = 32. This simulation additionally assumes that the
length of the school day is compatible with formal employment.
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V.

Data and Summary Statistics

The values of the independent variables in the simulations were determined through data
collection or meta-analysis. Those that used meta-analysis—education and fertility—are
mentioned in the prior methods section. Those that were calculated based on data collection—
rates of return, wages, and life expectancy—are described and summarized in this section.
To estimate the average rates of return across all AFP accounts, I used Chile’s national pension
database, Superindendencia de Pensiones. This dataset spans from 1981 – 2019, providing the
real annual profitability of each of the six major AFP companies for each type of pension fund:
A, B, C, D and E 20. The nominal rate is deflated by the rate of U.F. of the given period,
corresponding to the return obtained by the contributions that were maintained in the respective
Fund during the entire period considered. Compiling this data, I calculated the average
profitability across all AFP funds for each given year and fund risk level 21. However, since the
model used in this study assumed fixed level of risk aversity among AFP affiliates, I choose to
observe only the rates of return recorded from the moderate-risk pension fund, known as Fund C.

Rate of Return (percent)

Average AFP Rate of Return of Fund C Pensions
30
20
10
0
-10
-20

Year

Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones and own calculations
Using this information, I found the highest rate of return, the lowest rate of return, and calculated
the average rate of return across the years 1981 and 2019. The lowest rate of return was observed
in 2008, at -18.73%, while the highest rate of return was observed in 1991 at 29.74%. The
highest and lowest rates of return are used as the lower and upper bound values of r in each
simulation. The average value of r found, 8.37%, is also used in each simulation as the main rate
of observation. Values of r that lie between the lower-bound and average value of r as well as
between the average value and upper-bound value of r, are filled in to provide a wider range of
pension values produced from them. The range of values for r used across the simulations is
summarized below:
Range of Rate of Return, r
20
21

Funds ranked by level of risk, C being the average-risk fund.
See (insert figure number here) in the appendix
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Lowest r
Average r
Highest r

-18.73%
5%
6%
8.37%
10%
12%
29.74%

The value used for the average yearly wages and the minimum yearly wages across simulations
was gathered from the OECD statistics on average annual wages across all OECD countries
between the years of 2000 and 2020. The values used within each simulation reflect the average
Chilean wage in 2020 constant prices at 2020 USD PPPs. The value used to represent average
yearly wage across the simulations is $26,729USD, from the most recent measurement in 2020.
The value used to represent the minimum yearly wage across the simulations is $7,930.50USD,
from the most recent measurement in 2020. Placeholder values of roughly $50,000USD and
$85,000USD are used in the simulations to showcase the pensions of those affiliates with aboveaverage salaries, however, the results discussed from the simulations will focus on affiliates
earning the average yearly salary. The range of wages used across the simulations is summarized
below:
Range of Wages, w(L)
Minimum Yearly Wage
$7,930.50USD
Average Yearly Wage
$26,729USD
Placeholder Higher Yearly Wage
~$50,000USD
Placeholder Highest Yearly Wage
~$85,000USD
Because there was a lack of sufficient data on women’s yearly wages in Chile, I relied on metaanalysis to determine the wage values in simulations where a gender wage differential is taken
into account. These simulations rest on the assumption from Sánchez (2021) that Chilean men
earn, on average, 19% - 28% more than women as a result of the differences in labor supply
elasticities, ceteris paribus. To estimate this, Sánchez used Chile’s full administrative
Unemployment Insurance database provided by the Unemployment Fund Administrator. In a
sample of data ranging from January of 2010 to June of 2019, Sánchez considers individuals
with 18-64 and 18-59 years of age for men and women. They calculated labor supply elasticities
of 0.61 for men and 0.36 for women, and through using the main result of their theoretical
model, they arrived at the empirical value of the gender wage gap of 19 - 28%.
Data on life expectancy was collected from World Development Indicators, sourced from census
data from the United Nations World Population Prospects. Life expectancy at birth used in this
data is the average number of years a newborn is expected to live if mortality patterns at the time
of the newborn’s birth remain constant. It is calculated in a period life table which reflects a
population’s mortality pattern at a given time. The values for life expectancy used in the
simulations are the most recent values from 2020, given below:
Chilean Life Expectancy by Gender, 2020
Male
77.99 or ~78
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Female

82.5 or ~ 83

Data on the mean age of Chilean women at childbirth was collected from the OECD Family
Database. The value used in the fertility simulations is 29, the most recent value given for Chile
in the year 2020.
VI.

Results and Discussion

Simulation 1: Difference in Retirement Age

Retirement Pension: Differences in Retirement Age
$420,000.00

PENSION (USD)

$370,000.00
$320,000.00
$270,000.00
$220,000.00
$170,000.00
$120,000.00
$70,000.00
$20,000.00

Minimum

Average

Higher

Highest

WAGE LEVEL
Men

Women

The percent difference found between male and female retirees across all levels of income due to
differences in retirement age, ceteris paribus, is 36.66%. Under the assumptions of this
simulation, a female would only need to match the retirement age of men, working for an
additional 5 years, to eliminate the gender pension differential. However, this simulation is
grossly simplistic, as there are several other factors that come into play affecting a female’s
retirement pension in Chile.

Simulation 1: Incorporating Life Expectancy
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Replacement Rates: Differences in Retirement Age
53.06%

Rate of Return (r)

12.0%

171.42%
24.89%

10.0%
8.4%
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36.44%
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12.89%

5.0%
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0.00%

20.00%

40.00%

60.00%
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100.00%

120.00%

140.00%

160.00%

180.00%

Men

The pension differential is even further exacerbated through the incorporation of life expectancy.
Females in Chile live, on average, 5 years longer than men, meaning that females must finance a
longer retirement, while also retiring 5 years earlier. In total, this signifies a retirement period
that is 10 years longer than that of the average Chilean male. Under the assumptions of this
simulation, the impact of life expectancy on the retirement pension differential can be observed
by calculating the replacement rate between the male and female retiree. At the average rate of
return of 8.4%, replacement rates are 36.44% for men and 13.3% for women, respectively.
Simulation 2: Differences in Wages

PENSION AMOUNT OVER WORKING YEARS
(N)

Retirement Pensions: Gender Wage Differentials
$420,000
$370,000
$320,000
$270,000
$220,000
$170,000
$120,000
$70,000
$20,000

avg. min

avg. wage

mid upper
WAGE LEVEL

Male

Female

upper
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The percent difference found between male and female retirees across all levels of income due to
a 19% wage differential, is 17.35%, ceteris paribus. In other words, this result showcases the
pension differential that exists between male and female retirees solely because of a wage
differential. Following the assumption of this simulation that male and female retirees are now
both choosing to retire at the age of 65, a female would have to work approximately 2.2 years
longer than a man to eliminate the gender pension differential.
Simulation 2: Incorporating Life Expectancy

Replacement Rates: Wage Differential
121.00%

Rate of Return (r)
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Solely considering differential wages between men and women, at the average rate of return of
8.4%, the replacement rate of men is 36.12%, whereas for women, it is 25.50%. In contrast with
the previous simulation, the replacement rate of women actually increases with the incorporation
of life expectancy. This result is assumed to be because of the extra five years added to the
working life of a Chilean woman. During this added time period, she not only has the
opportunity to make additional contributions to her retirement fund, but her retirement funds in
total are given five extra years to accumulating, and thus, accruing a larger replacement ratio of
her lower salary relative to a man.
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Simulation 3: Considering Differences in Retirement Age and Wages

Retirement Pension: Wage Differentials and Differences in
Retirement Age
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avg. wage
Men
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Considering the combined pension effect of differences in retirement age and wages between
men and women, the percent difference between male and female pensions across all levels of
income is 56.05%, ceteris paribus. In other words, this is the result of a woman funding 5 extra
years of retirement while earning and income 19% lower than the average male salary. To
eliminate the gender pension differential, the average female Chilean would have to work
approximately 2.2 years longer than a man, and 7.2 years later than her legal retirement age of
60.
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Simulation 4: Education
4.1 Assuming Chilean Females earn 65% of Male Earnings after Graduation from University
Retirement Pension: Female Earning 65% of Male Earnings after
Graduation from University
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Under the assumption that Chilean females earn roughly 65% of the salary of their male
counterparts, post-tertiary graduation, the percent difference across all levels of income between
the pensions of men and women is found to be 79.36%. In this example, the average Chilean
woman would have to work 5 years longer than the average Chilean man, under the assumption
that they both retire at the age of 65, but 10 years longer than her legal retirement age of 60 to
eliminate the gender pension differential.
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4.2 Man with Secondary Degree vs. Female with Tertiary Degree

Retirement Pension: Man with Secondary Degree and Female
with Tertiary Degree
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Under the assumption that a college-graduate female earns a 19% return on her education, the
percent difference across all levels of income between the pensions of men and women is found
to be 69.20%. Due to her increased earnings across her working life relative to a high-school
graduate male, the average female Chilean only has to work approximately 1.8 years longer than
a man, but 7 years longer than her legal retirement age of 60 to eliminate the gender pension
differential. However, this wage differential of 19% is merely a placeholder, and nothing more
than a guess. With further calculation, it was found that if a woman were to complete four years
of tertiary education, start her working life at the age of 22 and retire at the age of 60, she will
have to earn an average yearly income across her working life that is 106% more than a highschool graduate male who started work at the age of 18.
Simulation 5: Childcare
5.1 The Birth of One Child
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Retirement Pension: Birth of One Child
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Under the assumption that the average female Chilean mother is a single mother who has her
first child at the age of 29, graduated from college at the age of 22, and chose to retire at the age
of 60, the percent difference across all levels of income between the pensions of men and women
is found to be 69.20%. This is assumed to be the result of the four years of at-home childcare a
mother must provide due to insufficient access to affordable childcare until the child is four years
of age. With the birth of one child, the working life of a Chilean woman is shortened drastically
relative to the Chilean man, providing her with fewer opportunities for pension contributions.
5.2 The Birth of a Second Child
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Retirement Pension: Birth of a Second Child
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Under the same starting assumptions as Simulation 5.1, the impact of the birth of a second child
is observed. The percent difference across all levels of income between the pensions of men and
women is found to be 83.076%. This difference between pensions represents the largest
difference found in this study and goes to show how far a policy created to expand affordable
childcare or offer more flexible maternity leave would go in terms of diminishing the gender
pension differential.
Limitations and Concluding Remarks
These counterfactuals tell a story, but they are extremely limited in their representation of reality
as it exists in Chile. However, they aren’t meant to display the most intricate and realistic of
situations. What was intended with these simulations was instead the demonstrations of the
simplest situations that great inequality, so that one can imagine the inequality produced from
much more complex and real scenarios. The specific limitations of this study are as follows; it
assumed a fixed rate of return across the working life of Chileans, it assumed a fixed wage
instead of wage growth over the working life of Chileans. These are identified as areas for
further study under more intricate methods of analysis and using ample data. Additionally,
several of the simulations conducted had to be simplified using the results from previous studies
and meta-analysis due to the lack of sufficient data. If sufficient data could have been located to
explore this research question, the preferred method of analysis would have been a regression.
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